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Soft budget constraints (SBCs) are a persistent feature of transi-
tion economies and have been blamed for i.a. a lack of ﬁscal consol-
idation and sluggish growth. EU eastward enlargement has – among
other things – been conditioned on tackling SBCs. This paper ana-
lyzes such outside conditionality theoretically and empirically. First,
modelling the SBC problem as a war of attrition between the applicant
countries’ governments and ﬁrms we ﬁnd that outside conditionality
can foster SBC hardening. Yet, toughening the EU stance or reduc-
ing the number of enlargement rounds may have ambiguous eﬀects.
Second, estimating SBC hardening in a partial adjustment model by
measuring the reaction of employment to output changes we ﬁnd that
EU conditionality did indeed help candidates to ﬁght SBCs.
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0Can EU Conditionality Remedy Soft Budget
Constraints in Transition Countries?
Abstract
Soft budget constraints (SBCs) are a persistent feature of
transition economies and have been blamed for i.a. a lack of ﬁscal
consolidation and sluggish growth. EU eastward enlargement has –
among other things – been conditioned on tackling SBCs. This paper
analyzes such outside conditionality theoretically and empirically.
First, modelling the SBC problem as a war of attrition between
the applicant countries’ governments and ﬁrms we ﬁnd that outside
conditionality can foster SBC hardening. Yet, toughening the EU
stance or reducing the number of enlargement rounds may have
ambiguous eﬀects. Second, estimating SBC hardening in a partial
adjustment model by measuring the reaction of employment to output
changes we ﬁnd that EU conditionality did indeed help candidates to
ﬁght SBCs.
Key Words: soft budget constraint, EU enlargement, war of attrition.
JEL: F15, D78, P21, P26, P30, G30
1 Introduction
The problem of soft budget constraints (SBCs) – the lack of ﬁnancial disci-
pline at the ﬁrm level, whether state or privately owned – remains a persistent
feature of many transition economies (e.g. Kornai, Maskin, Roland 2003; Ko-
rnai, 2001; EBRD, 1999, ch.7). Yet in view of the progressing eastward en-
largement of the European Union, many observers have concluded that since
future membership is conditional on a series of key economic and institu-
tional performance measures, problems inherited from the socialist past such
as SBCs would be overcome.1 For example, the EBRD (2001) comments:
1Obviously this supposed beneﬁcial impact from outside conditionality arises for a num-
ber of economic problems and from the conditionalities imposed by a host of institutions.
For example, Perotti (1998: 1706) notes: “(...) there is a clear beneﬁt in the commitment
value created by international institutions with a reputation for tough lending criteria such
as the IMF and the World Bank.”
1“It is therefore important to recognise that international inte-
gration can complement domestic factors in advancing reforms
and in strengthening economic performance. The EU accession
process has been a strong inﬂuence on the direction and pace of
reform for the ten candidate countries (...), and this has helped
to counter the inﬂuence of domestic vested interests.”
(EBRD, 2001: 11)
The conditionality imposed by the existing EU member states on appli-
cants from Central and Eastern Europe2 is most prominent in the Copen-
hagen Criteria. These criteria outline conditions which the applicants have
to fulﬁll for later membership to become feasible. The European Council
meeting in Copenhagen, June 1993, introduced the criteria under the phrase
‘conditional acceptance of eventual membership’. The following three top-
level conditions were announced: (i) Stable institutions guaranteeing democ-
racy, rule of law, human and minority rights. (ii) Existence of a functioning
market economy. Capacity to cope with the competitive pressures and mar-
ket forces within the Union. (iii) Ability to adopt and implement the acquis
communautaire and adherence to the aims of political, economic, and mon-
etary union. The second and third criteria have a clear linkage to economic
policy in the applicant countries. Particular relevant in the context of the
present discussion is the demand for ‘adherence to the aims of ... economic
and monetary union’, which evokes the fulﬁlment of the Maastricht criteria
with the well known ﬁscal deﬁcit and government debt limits, hence a strict
ceiling on conceivable state transfers to ﬁrms. Moreover, the acquis com-
munautaire requires i.a. that the rules of European competition policy and
industrial policy be implemented, which restrict the payment of subsidies
to loss-making enterprises. Finally, in practice, the monitoring of state aid
practices (EU Treaty - Article 87) and ﬁnancial sector reform in the applicant
countries were key elements of the enlargement process.
Since the ‘Agenda 2000’, which was drafted in 1997, the European Com-
mission has produced regular progress reports on the applicant countries.
Encompassing a host of topics related to the fulﬁlment of the Copenhagen
Criteria, these reports deal extensively with issues of structural reform. They
monitor, in particular, progress in ﬁnancial sector and banking reform, lend-
2The status of an accession candidate to the EU was granted to Bulgaria, Czech Repub-
lic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia among
the transition countries. In addition, Cyprus, Malta and Turkey belong to the group of
accession candidates. With the exception of Bulgaria and Romania all accession candidate
countries from Central and Eastern Europe will join the EU in 2004, and Bulgaria and
Romania may enter the EU in another enlargement round in 2007.
2ing practices, state-to-enterprise relations and ﬁrm restructuring. These
items have clear implications for the existence or rather removal of SBCs.
For example, the 2000 progress report for Lithuania remarks:
“Another factor that hinders in-depth restructuring is the lenient
ﬁnancial discipline in enterprises, which is caused by a slow en-
forcement of bankruptcy procedures and the existence of soft bud-
get constraints.”
(European Commission, 2000: 69)
Furthermore, the Commission’s emphasis on banking sector reform and
the decentralization and privatization of state banks3 is fully in line with one
of the prominent remedies to the SBC problem that emerges from the sem-
inal Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) formulation of the SBC phenomenon;
namely, the decentralization of credit as the key element of institutional re-
form necessary to impose ﬁnancial discipline on ﬁrms. However, it is an open
question whether and to what degree the conditionality of the EU is indeed
enforced in the enlargement process. For example, the strong political back-
ing which was provided by Greece to Cyprus or by Germany to Poland made
it unlikely that these countries could have failed, even if they would had not
implemented the acquis communautaire completely.4
In this paper we use EU eastward enlargement with its membership con-
ditions to study – both theoretically and empirically – the mechanics and
eﬀectiveness of such outside conditionality on removing SBCs. How and
when does such outside conditionality actually help the applicant country to
conduct the shift towards a regime with institutions enforcing hard budget
constraints?
In the theoretical section, we model the issue of SBCs and outside con-
ditionality as a game between the national governments and ﬁrms. The
government aims for and beneﬁts from hard budget constraints (HBCs) but
is unable to enforce such a policy against the will of the ﬁrms, as ﬁrms – for
which the SBC can be viewed as a no-cost insurance against ﬁnancial prob-
lems or indeed an ex post negotiated subsidy – maintain the power to block
3For example, the 1998 progress report for the Czech Republic reads “Signiﬁcant prob-
lems still remain in the ﬁnancial sector, especially in the banking sector, which suﬀers
from an acute problem of bad loans. In order to create a sound and competitive banking
sector, the remaining state-owned banks need to be privatised.” (European Commission,
1998: 25)
4It is noteworthy, however, that the only two applicants that received explicit com-
ments on persisting SBC problems in the decisive 2002 progress reports were Bulgaria
and Romania (see European Commission, 2002a: ch 2.3, p.44 and European Commission,
2002b: ch 2.3, p.42, respectively), the two countries that have not been allowed to join
the EU in 2004.
3any reform.5 Further, both players would beneﬁt from EU membership, but
only the government can lead the negotiations, i.e. only it has the power to
submit and push or to postpone and delay the country’s membership appli-
cation. Hence the players can hold each other hostage, and a war of attrition
unfolds. In this waiting game – in the spirit of Alesina and Drazen (1991) –
the ﬁrms hope for the government to push for membership to the EU even
though the SBC issue is unresolved, while the government may delay ap-
plication hoping for ﬁrms to tighten their budgets, citing EU membership
conditions as its justiﬁcation. The game is won by the player willing to wait
the longest for his favorite outcome to materialise. In this setting we ﬁnd
that once the outside institution (EU) imposes a tough conditionality de-
manding HBCs, the game does change in favor of the government, hence EU
conditionality can remedy the SBC problem by solving part of the dynamic
commitment problem. We also introduce uncertainty with regard to the type
of EU, i.e. whether the EU will admit countries with SBCs, and discuss also
a number of scenarios in which the outside conditionality may or may not
help to harden SBCs.
In the empirical part of this paper, we examine whether obtaining the
candidate status in the EU enlargement process corresponds to a regime
shift towards HBCs. Since the degree of SBC hardening is diﬃcult to measure
directly, we build our empirical investigation on an indirect measure, namely,
the adjustment of employment to changes in demand and output. In a ﬁrst
step, we formalise the idea that, under SBCs, ﬁrms display a higher labour-
to-output ratio and a slower adjustment of employment to outside shocks. In
the second step, we derive from our theoretical considerations a simple partial
adjustment model which forms the basis for our econometric analysis. We
obtain the following empirical results: Countries which possess a candidate
status yields both a lower labour-to-output ratio in the long run and a higher
speed of adjustment of employment to output shocks relative to countries
which do not. We observe signiﬁcant diﬀerences in economic behaviour both
before and after the candidate status was granted within the sample of the
(later) candidate countries, as well as between the candidate countries and
the transition countries outside the circle of the EU applicants. Thus we
ﬁnd in our empirical part evidence that the status of an accession candidate
to the EU has indeed changed economic behaviour in the direction towards
HBCs.
Section 2 recaps central developments in the SBC literature and places
the present paper in this context. Section 3 introduces the model, and exam-
5What we envisage here is a policy stalemate, where the status quo rules as long as no
consensus between the government and ﬁrms forms.
4ines the impact from diﬀerent ﬁrm, government and EU parameters on SBC
hardening. Section 4 presents empirical evidence on whether the candidate
status of transition economies and the associated EU conditionality did in-
deed have an impact on SBC hardening. Section 5 concludes the paper and
presents some policy implications.
2 SBC theory – main ideas and concepts
The pioneering work on soft budget constraints in the context of socialist
economies and later transition economies has been carried out by Kornai
(1979, 1980).6 Recent major overviews of the theoretical and empirical liter-
ature are given in Kornai, Maskin and Roland (2003), Maskin and Xu (2001),
Kornai (2001), Dewatripont and Roland (2000) and Maskin (1999). The SBC
syndrome is typically understood as a dynamic commitment problem of some
central agent or authority – say the government or a bank – not to bail out
ﬁrms in ﬁnancial distress.7
The theoretical explanations of SBCs found in the literature take several
diﬀerent angles: The ﬁrst line of reasoning which is associated with Kor-
nai’s initial work (1979, 1980) derives the SBC syndrome from paternalistic
motives of the government. Schaﬀer’s (1989) early formalization of this prin-
ciple states that the government repeatedly demands ﬁnancial discipline at
the ﬁrm level, but is unable to enforce its demands ex post because of social
or political costs and thus ends up bailing out ﬁrms. Hence countries are
6Obviously, SBCs are not conﬁned to socialist or transition economies. For example
the ‘rescue’ of the Philipp Holzman AG organised by the German government in 1999 is
certainly an incident which, by most deﬁnitions, would qualify as an SBC. Also, the formal
stepping stone we apply in our empirical analysis of Section 4 is related to Hillman et al.
(1987) who formulate a theory of government bail-outs with no reference to planning or
transition economies.
7This inability to make dynamic commitments is best illustrated as follows: “Initially,
when a BC-enterprise [a ﬁrm] is ﬁrst set up and funded, the prospects for success look good.
Moreover, to provide the incentive for hard work – which would increase the probability
of success – the S-organization [government or bank] may declare that it will refuse to bail
the enterprise out should ﬁnancial diﬃculties later arise. But later if the enterprise does
get into trouble, the S-organization has no way to enforce that declaration. Furthermore,
although the expense entailed in repeated bailouts may be high, the cost of economic and
social disruption ensuing from the enterprise’s collapse could well be even higher. And so
ex post there may be an irresistible force for making the bailouts. Indeed, if the potential
disruption from collapse is big enough, both parties will anticipate a continuing sequence
of bailouts.” (Kornai, Maskin and Roland, 2003, p.13). Furthermore, had the ﬁrm believed
the initial declaration by the government or bank, it would work harder, perform better
and the need for a later bail out would have been less likely to materialized in the ﬁrst
place.
5stuck in the SBC status quo. This approach is complemented by political
economy type explanations, where the government tolerates an SBC in re-
turn for political support, or in order to avoid unemployment (e.g. Shleifer
and Vishny, 1994; Hillman et al. 1987). However, these theories do not
provide an explanation of the diﬀerences in the occurrence of SBCs under
diﬀerent systems, i.e. they do not derive the SBC endogenously within the
theoretical framework.
This gap in the SBC literature is closed in a second strand of the literature
that follows the seminal paper of Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) in deriving
the tension between ex ante intention and ex post behavior from economic
principles. In the simplest version of the Dewatripont and Maskin model (see
for example Dewatripont and Roland, 2000, and Maskin and Xu, 2001), a
bank or the government can ﬁnance a number of projects/ﬁrms which either
are good and quick or bad and slow. The type of the projects is unknown
to the ﬁnancing authority, and slow projects will need to be injected with
extra funding at a later stage in order to be completed. Within this setup,
reﬁnancing is sequentially optimal and hence also entrepreneurs with bad
projects will apply for initial funding. However, once the ﬁnancial authority
has lost all opportunity to reﬁnance – e.g. a decentralized banking sector
where each bank is too small to fund more than one project – then bad
projects would need to obtain their second dose of funding from a new bank.
Yet, since the new bank has no share in the sunk cost of the initial period,
it will be unwilling to bring a bad project towards completion. By this
token, fewer bad projects will be initialized to begin with, and hard budget
constraints will be enforced.
Manifestations of the SBC phenomenon are soft loans, budgetory subsi-
dies, tax arrears, credit arrears, wage arrears, etc. (for a detailed discussion
see Section 4). The consequences of SBCs are – apart from the immediate
negative impact on allocative eﬃciency and, related to this, the phenomena
of shortages (e.g. Kornai, 1980; Quian, 1994) – a lack of ﬁscal consolida-
tion, problems of international competitiveness, ﬁnancial bubbles, a lack of
innovation and not least, a negative impact on overall economic growth (e.g.
Kornai, 2001; Huang and Xu, 1999; Bai and Wang, 1999; Quian and Xu,
1998).
Several solutions to the SBC problem have been proposed along the lines
of the main explanations of SBCs: demonopolisation, devolution (or federal-
ism), ﬁnancial sector reform, etc. (e.g. Dewatripont and Roland, 2000; Quian
and Roland, 1998; Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995). On the other hand, more
closely related to the present approach – though not addressing SBCs – are
Alesina and Drazen (1991) dealing with ﬁscal stabilisation, Perotti (1998)
dealing with ﬁnancial sector reform in transition economies and Heinemann
6(2000) examining the strategic eﬀects when creating the EMU. In each of
these papers, outside conditionality was able to generate a beneﬁcial impact
by dragging the economy out of its status quo. In contrast, a recent pa-
per of Roland and Verdier (2003) on law enforcement in transition countries
establishes the counterintuitive result that an accession to the EU without
conditionality may increase the probability of overcoming a poor status quo
if EU membership is associated with improved access to technologies which
support law enforcement.
The present paper complements the existing SBC literature by theoret-
ically and empirically examining the role of outside conditionality on hard-
ening SBCs. We develop and test a framework where the SBC is assumed
to exist in the status quo such that the government is repeatedly forced to
accept SBCs at the ﬁrm level. This can be caused by an underlying mech-
anism such as soft credits granted by a centralised or state-owned banking
sector (Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995) or sheer paternalism in the state-
ﬁrm relationship (Kornai, 1980; Schaﬀer, 1989). On its own – without the
broader consensus of ﬁrms – the government is unable to bring about the
shift towards a regime with institutions enforcing HBC. In our theoretical
and empirical analysis we then address the following questions: What are
the eﬀects of adding outside conditionality into the domestic game between
ﬁrms and government? When can such outside demands challenge the status
quo and alter the game in favour of hard budget constraints? Has EU condi-
tionality in the enlargement process helped to remedy SBCs in the candidate
countries?
3 A simple model of outside conditionality
Consider a non-EU country where an SBC problem exists. Even though
the government, g, beneﬁts from and prefers a state of HBCs, it is unable
to enforce this policy due to a dynamic commitment problem. In other
words, even though ex ante the government would rather not rescue ﬁrms
in ﬁnancial diﬃculties, because it hopes to induce eﬀort and thus reduce the
risk of failure, ex post it ﬁnds it in its own best interest to bail out troubled
ﬁrms. For example this SBC status quo could be caused by an underlying
problem of centralised credit (Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995).8 Firms, f,
beneﬁt from SBCs. From their perspective, the SBC can be viewed as a free
insurance against unfavorable ﬁnancial states (Hillman et al., 1987) or as an
8Alternatively, paternalistic or opportunistic motives of the state (Kornai, 1980; Schaf-
fer, 1989; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994) could be the cause of the status quo.
7ex post subsidy, favourable tax break etc.9 Modelling the SBC like this in
reduced form allows us to obtain a simple enough speciﬁcation that the issue
of outside conditionality can be introduced. Furthermore the core issues of
the SBC mechanics and the associated commitment problems are already
well understood in the literature (see Section 2). Our focus is on the eﬀects
of adding outside conditionality to the SBC setting outlined above. What is
crucial to the present analysis is the assumption that any change in regime
(SBC or HBC) can only be obtained in consensus between the two players,
thus the ﬁrms can hold the government hostage and impose the status quo
SBC regime onto the government. The idea that the softness can be forced
upon a government is embedded in several theories of the SBC (Kornai,
Maskin and Roland, 2003, p.8): for example, ﬁrms facing ﬁnancial troubles
may simply fail to pay taxes, but the government may also face prohibitive
costs in bringing about the liquidation of ﬁrms which have failed to pay
taxes.10 As a result the problem of the SBC persists until it is tackled through
the consensus regime change. What we envisage here is a policy stalemate,
where the status quo rules as long as no consensus between government and
ﬁrms forms. By the same token, once the system has arrived at an HBC
status quo, the switch back can also only be achieved with a consensus of
both parties.11 If, as introduced above, the underlying SBC problem is caused
by a centralisation of credit (Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995), the necessary
regime change enforcing HBC would be the decentralisation and privatisation
of the banking sector. The government desires this regime change but lacks
the tools to enforce it against the will of the ﬁrms.12
9We have chosen to set up the SBC problem as a conﬂict between ﬁrms and government,
even though the SBC transmitting agent may still be the ﬁnancial sector – either directly,
as in the Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) model, or indirectly where the government bails
out banks with accumulated bad loans instead of bailing out ﬁrms (Dewatripont and
Roland, 2000, pp.246).
10Furthermore, during the early years of transition, legal systems may not be ﬁt to
enforce ﬁnancial demands from the government. Yet, more commonly, softness may be
voluntarily, in the sense that political interests such as avoiding excessive unemployment
or too-big-to-fail arguments may make the government opt for an SBC strategy, no matter
what threats and punishments it initially has announced.
11Accordingly, when an economy displays HBCs, ﬁrms might still prefer government
support in times of distress, but not be able to get it.
12Our separation into two states (SBC or HBC) is of course a stark simpliﬁcation. As
Kornai (1998) points out, SBC and HBC are more a matter of degree of hardness than of
well deﬁned static states. Yet, the idea that under certain conditions economies experience
regime shifts from one state into another appears to us a useful way of thinking about
the issue. One example of such a regime shift are the fundamental changes in the British
economy under Margaret Thatcher, which could even be interpreted as a hardening of
budget constraints, at least for certain sectors.
8The power of ﬁrms to maintain the status quo is counterbalanced by the
prospect of EU membership, whereby the EU imposes membership conditions
concerning the hardening of SBCs. Both players, g and f, beneﬁt from EU
membership. But only the government can negotiate with the EU, i.e. the
government has the power to submit and push or to postpone the membership
application for the current enlargement round. Thus, a war of attrition
unfolds between g and f. The government can attempt, via a delay in the
EU membership process, to force ﬁrms into a pro-HBC regime shift, while
ﬁrms can block the regime shift, via their refusal to cooperate, hence exerting
pressure to obtain EU membership despite persisting SBCs.
The membership conditions that the EU – as an outside institution –
has imposed via the Copenhagen criteria include ﬁnancial micro and macro
discipline,13 conditionalities that may be enforced to varying degrees. The
actual toughness of the outside institution is unknown to both agents. The
perceived probability of the EU being soft – allowing the country to enter
despite of SBCs – is p, the probability that the applicant country is allowed to
become a member for political, geographic or other reasons despite persisting
SBCs. Note that p can, and most probably does, vary for diﬀerent candidate
countries depending on their political backing in the enlargement process.
In the status quo (SBCs continue and no EU membership), payoﬀs
for g and f alike are normalised to zero. Any change from the status
quo commands the following present value payoﬀs: The gains for g of
becoming an EU member are ®. The government’s total beneﬁts associated
with HBCs, for example stemming from increased tax revenue and ﬁscal
stabilisation following the removal of SBCs, are ¾. The gains for f from
EU membership are ¯, e.g. the value of market access to the EU or
infrastructure investments following membership. The present value of all
costs that ﬁrms face when removing SBCs – i.e. the loss of the insurance or
subsidy value that the SBCs constitute or the risk of bankruptcy net of the
potential eﬃciency gains from HBCs – is ¿. Table 1 summarises the payoﬀs.
All parameters ®;¾;¯;¿ > 0.
Table 1: Payoﬀs from changes of the status quo
EU membership HBC regime
Government ® ¾
Firms ¯ ¡¿
13See our discussion of the enlargement process in Section 1.
9The sequence of the game is as follows:
² Step zero: EU opens enlargement round and imposes HBC condition.
² Step one: f choose to discipline budgets (HBC) or to maintain the status
quo (SBC).
² Step two: g chooses to submit or not to submit a membership application,
and
¡ if the country displays an HBC and a membership application is sub-
mitted, the EU accepts the new member with certainty,
¡ if the country displays an SBC and a membership application is sub-
mitted, the EU accepts the new member with probability p (soft EU)
or rejects the applicant with probability 1 ¡ p (hard EU).
² Step three: If g does not submit an application or if the country is rejected
on grounds of an SBC, the game starts anew with probability (1 ¡ Á) in
the next round.
Thus, the game may end – possibly after some periods of delay – with
either EU membership and HBCs or with EU membership and SBCs. Fur-
ther, if the game starts again from the beginning there is a “closing the
door” probability of 0 < Á < 1, i.e. the risk that there will be no further
enlargement rounds, and that, hence, the game will end with no membership
and continuation of SBCs (the status quo) in the indeﬁnite future.14 It also
immediately follows that once an HBC is obtained in step one, it will be
g’s dominant strategy to submit an application and push for membership,
yielding a certain government payoﬀ ® + ¾. More importantly, in step two,
if a country places an application but is rejected on grounds of an SBC, in-
formation on the actual EU type is disclosed – altering the payoﬀs of the
next round. Only g can call forth this action (unveil information). Once the
EU type is established to be tough, the game changes into a trivial version
where payoﬀs for ﬁrms and government become either zero forever or ¯ ¡ ¿
and ®+¾ respectively. However, from the government’s perspective, forcing
the EU to disclose its type bears the risk of the EU turning out to be soft.
Hence, the country would enter with persisting SBCs (payoﬀs ¯ and ® for
ﬁrms and government respectively).
It can be noted immediately:
Lemma 1. If ¯ ¡ ¿ < 0, then neither a fully credible and committed gov-
ernment nor outside conditionality can enforce a regime shift in favour of
14Note that the EU has never formally closed enlargement rounds for a country, but
has, as the case of Turkey demonstrates, put application requests into cold storage for
decades.
10HBCs.
This says that if the costs of hardening budgets are too high, or if ﬁrms do
not value EU membership highly, then the government cannot enforce budget
discipline, also not via outside conditionality. Hence in the remainder of the
paper we assume ¿ < ¯.
Players discount the future. Payoﬀs realised in subsequent periods are
discounted at the rate of time preference ½j ; j = g;f for the government
and ﬁrms respectively. This gives a discount factor 1
1+½j(1 ¡ Á); j = g;f,
where (1¡Á) is the probability that the game will continue to the next round.
Although waiting is costly, the players are willing to wait in order to obtain
their favorite outcome, i.e. hoping for the other player to give up.15 This war
of attrition game is won by the player willing to wait the longest. On this,
see Alesina and Drazen (1991) for a version with incomplete information or
Hendricks et al. (1988) for a complete information variant.
The favoured outcomes of the two players are: the government wins if
HBC discipline is obtained and the country becomes an EU member (®+¾).
For ﬁrms the favoured outcome depends on p. For a large enough p, the
ﬁrm wins if the government applies for EU membership even though SBCs
persists; membership may or may not result immediately, depending on the
EU type. However, for a low p, ﬁrms and government agree on the best
possible outcome, as shown below.
Lemma 2. Firms and government agree on the favoured outcome, namely
to switch to an HBC regime and to submit an application, if
p < (¯ ¡ ¿)
½f + Á
¯(½f + Á) + ¿(1 ¡ Á)
(1)
If Lemma 2 is fulﬁlled the game ends immediately with HBC and EU
membership.16 Lemma 2 states that for a strict EU – a low p in the sense of
(1) – ﬁrms and government will agree on their strategies, and no player will
beneﬁt from waiting. Thus in a sense, lemma 2 already answers the question
posed by this paper: outside conditionality can remedy the SBC problem.
15For the government, giving up means submitting an application and pushing for EU
membership even though SBCs persist. For ﬁrms, it means disciplining the SBC into an
HBC.
16Lemma 2 is derived by solving the inequality (¯¡¿) > p¯+(1¡p)
³
1¡Á
1+½f (¯ ¡ ¿)
´
for p,
i.e. the critical p is determined by equating the ﬁrms losing payoﬀ (¯¡¿) with the winning
payoﬀ, whereby the winning payoﬀ has a probability p of obtaining EU membership with
an SBC (¯) and a probability 1 ¡ p of rejection today and hence a tough EU, such that
membership at best can be obtained in the next period with an HBC (
1¡Á
1+½f (¯ ¡ ¿)).
11As can be easily intuited, the condition in (1) is less likely to be fulﬁlled if
the costs of hardening SBCs, ¿, increases, and if the future means more to
ﬁrms (i.e. if either ½f or Á decrease).
Thus, in terms of policy, one can immediately conclude that the power
of outside conditionality is increased when the EU directly compensates the
applicant country’s ﬁrms for the costs of budget disciplining (reducing ¿), or
implements a tough closing-the-door-policy (large Á).17 In the remainder of
this paper we assume that p is larger than the critical value stated in (1).
Under this assumption, ﬁrm interests and government interests are opposed
and hence a war of attrition setting exists.
Two limiting cases complete our basic outline of the model. First con-
sider how the game would change if the EU were fundamentally and credibly
committed to strict conditionality. Setting p = 0, the government action is
eﬀectively of no concern to the outcome, and the game is reduced to a simple
decision of ﬁrms between SBC (payoﬀ: 0) and HBC (payoﬀ: ¯ ¡ ¿). Given
lemma 1, EU membership and HBCs will result immediately, since ¯ > ¿.
Second consider the game if there were no EU, i.e. consider a country for
which EU membership is no option. Accordingly, by setting ® = ¯ = 0, we
immediately ﬁnd that the SBC problem will persist indeﬁnitely.
3.1 Solution with EU conditionality
The war of attrition is won by the player willing to wait the longest for his
favorite outcome to materialise. If the game is played under complete infor-
mation – except regarding the type of EU – and using only pure strategies,
then there will be no substantial delay. Instead the losing player will give up
right away rather than enduring any delay (Hendricks et al., 1988). In set-
tings of incomplete information, the game may feature some delay (Alesina
and Drazen, 1991). In either case the winner of the game is determined by
the maximum waiting times each player is willing to accept and, hence, by
the parameters of the model which aﬀect these waiting times. The maximum
willingness of ﬁrms to wait is determined by equating the discounted value











= ¯ ¡ ¿ (2)
The right-hand side is simply the present value of giving up right away,
i.e. implementing HBCs and thus becoming an EU member. The left-hand
17As a matter of fact, the oﬃcial position of the EU is that there is no limit on the
number of future enlargement rounds (Á ! 0) which would, by lemma 2, weaken the
impact of the set conditionality.
12side is the present value to the ﬁrms of the government applying for EU
membership at time ¯ tf while SBCs persist. The ﬁrst term is the probability
that the country faces a soft EU and actually enters at time ¯ tf with an SBC
times the value from entering with a soft budget. The second term is the
probability of facing a hard EU, a fact established only after an unsuccessful
application in period ¯ tf, and hence entering in the next enlargement round
with an HBC times the value of entering minus the cost of hardening budgets.
From (2) we can solve for the maximum waiting time of the ﬁrm:
¯ tf = ln
µ
(¯ ¡ ¿)(1 + ½f)








The government’s waiting can be calculated by equating the favorite out-












The left hand side is the value of winning at time ¯ tg, while the right hand side
is the value of giving up today, and either becoming an EU member while
SBCs persist (payoﬀ ®) with probability p or establishing the type of EU
to be hard with probability 1 ¡ p, and hence enforcing HBCs and becoming
an EU member in the next round (payoﬀ ® + ¾). From (4) the maximum
waiting time of the government is:
¯ tg = ln
µ
(® + ¾)(1 ¡ p)(1 ¡ Á) + ®(1 + ½g)p








Due to the sequential nature of the game, when ﬁrms are ‘tough’ i.e.
maintain SBCs, then if the government decides to postpone the enlargement
negotiation (punish the ﬁrms), it can at best achieve its favorite outcome in
the next enlargement round. Formally we can state:
Lemma 3. The government wins the game if ¯ tg > ¯ tf +1, resulting in HBCs
and EU membership.
The reasoning of lemma (3) is the common intuition behind the war of
attrition where the player that can establish that he is willing to wait longer
– either by demonstrating his ability to wait (incomplete information) or
because his ability to wait is known (complete information) – wins the game
after the second player realises the ﬁrst one’s ability to hold out longer and
maximises his payoﬀ by giving up right away (see Bliss and Nalebuﬀ, 1984;
Alesina and Drazen, 1991; Hendricks et al., 1988). The basic reasoning of
13lemma (3) can thus be summarised by the function h = ¯ tg¡¯ tf ¡1, which, for
positive values, says that the government is winning, and for negative values

























´ ¡ 1 (6)
3.2 Results
In the following the reaction of h to changes in the various parameters will
be examined.
Government and ﬁrm parameters
When diﬀerentiating h with respect to the gain, cost and time preference
parameters of the two players, we obtain the central war of attrition results.
Expressed in terms of the government’s chances of winning, we can state:
Proposition 1. The government’s maximum waiting time increases relative
to the ﬁrm’s maximum waiting time, i.e. the government’s chances of win-
ning – the applicant country joining the EU with an HBC – increase, when:
i) the government’s payoﬀ from EU membership, ®, decreases
ii) the government’s payoﬀ from HBC, ¾, increases
iii) the government becomes more patient, i.e. ½g decreases
iv) the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ from EU membership, ¯, increases
v) the ﬁrm’s cost from implementing HBC, ¿, decrease
vi) the ﬁrm become less patient, i.e. ½f increases.
Proof of these propositions, i.e. the signs for the various derivatives of h,
as well as of all further results of this model are given in a separate Appendix
available from the authors upon request. The results stated in proposition 1
have a clear intuitive interpretation: a government too eager to enter the EU
may forgo the beneﬁcial eﬀect of outside conditionality and pressure for EU
membership, even though SBCs prevail. Similarly, if the beneﬁts of HBCs for
the government become more substantial, its ability to wait for its favorite
outcome increases. On the other hand, if ﬁrms obtain substantial beneﬁts
from EU membership, then their cost of postponement is high and they will
14give up earlier. Conversely, given higher costs of hardening SBCs, ﬁrms will
be willing to wait longer, hoping for their favorite outcome – membership
with SBCs. Finally, patience – as always in the war of attrition – is a good
winning strategy.
In terms of policy, proposition 1 (i), for example, gives a novel perspective
on the strict rejection that several candidate governments voiced in response
to the Commission’s proposals for watered-down ﬁnancial support to new
members in the future Common Agricultural Policy. In fact this might not
be so much a signal to Brussels as to their own ﬁrms and economies, namely
that the national government is not ready to seek membership at any price,
i.e. has the power to wait. Similarly, proposition 1 (ii) could read that the
package deal, where the EMU is part of the long-term enlargement project,
implies that HBCs become more important for national governments, again
strengthening their position vis-` a-vis ﬁrms. Finally, from proposition 1 (iv)
and (v), it follows that if the EU aims at helping candidates to implement a
regime shift in favor of HBCs, then increasing the beneﬁts that ﬁrms obtain
from EU membership (for example reserving full market access to members
only) and dampening or compensating the costs resulting from budget hard-
ening and ﬁrm restructuring (e.g. the EU ﬁnancial assistance programs under
the Europe Agreements) are sensible policy measures.
Tough versus soft EU conditionality
The probability of the EU being soft, p, and the probability of closing the
door, Á, aﬀect both the government’s as well as the ﬁrms’ willingness to wait.
Starting with the perceived probability that the country faces a soft EU, the
government’s maximum waiting may de- or increase with an increase in p.
In particular, the following result can be stated:
Lemma 4. An increase in the probability, p, that the EU is soft will make
the government
i) less willing to wait if ® > (® + ¾)
1¡Á
1+½g
ii) more willing to wait if ® < (® + ¾)
1¡Á
1+½g
For proof, see separate Appendix. In case i) the government’s maximum
waiting time falls if the probability that the EU is soft increases. In fact,
what the condition ® > (® + ¾)
1¡Á
1+½g says is that losing the game today is
worth more than winning it tomorrow. Put diﬀerently, the winning-to-losing
payoﬀ has such a narrow margin (¾ is relatively small) that the government
is unwilling to even endure a single round of delay (and the risk of closing
15the door). However, in case ii) the government will be willing to wait longer
if the probability that the EU is soft increases, since an increase in p means
that when the government presses for EU membership to disclose the EU
type, it faces the larger risk of entry without having disciplined SBCs. On
the other hand, for the ﬁrms, we ﬁnd that
@¯ tf
@p > 0. By speculating on a
larger chance of being able to join with an SBC, ﬁrms’ maximum waiting
time always increases as p increases. Thus the overall eﬀect of an increase in
p depends on the degree by which the two players’ maximum waiting times
increase in reaction to an increase in the perceived probability that the EU
is soft. To facilitate further comparison, we set the rate of time preference
for the two players equal to zero (½g = ½f = 0). There is still discounting in
the model, since Á > 0.
Proposition 2. Consider the probability level ˆ p = 1 + ®
2¾ ¡
¯
2¿ that the EU
is of the soft type.
i) If p > ˆ p, then there exists a critical Ác; 0 < Ác < 1 such that
(a) for a high risk of closing the door in the sense of Á > Ác an increase
in p worsens the chance that the government wins;
(b) while for a low risk of closing the door in the sense of Ác > Á an
increase in p improves the chance that the government wins.
ii) If p < ˆ p, then for any level of Á an increase in p worsens the chances
that the government wins.
For proof see separate Appendix. Proposition 2 says that the generally
expected case where an increased probability that the EU is soft reduces
the government’s chances of winning and thus increases the chances of entry
with SBCs, does not apply for all parameter constellations. In particular,
if the EU is perceived as relatively soft in the sense of p > ˆ p then if suﬃ-
ciently many enlargement rounds are planned (i(b)) a further increase in EU
softness beneﬁts the government, hence making it more likely that the gov-
ernment’s favorite outcome will occur. By increasing the softness of the EU,
the government has an increased risk that when unveiling the information
regarding the EU type, the country may in fact be permitted to enter with
SBCs. Hence the government’s willingness to wait increases suﬃciently as a
reaction to an increased probability that the EU is soft, such that the ﬁrms’
willingness to wait will be outpaced.18 The possibility that such a scenario









18In terms of the oﬃcial EU position only case (b) in proposition 2 (i) applies, since
oﬃcially there is no limitation on the number of future enlargement rounds. Rather, each
16Corollary 1. If ®+2¾
¾ <
¯




¾, then ˆ p > 1 and hence we are in case ii) in proposition 2.
Thus for a suﬃciently large ¾, the scenario of case i) in proposition 2
will always exist, such that for a low enough risk of closing the door, Á, an
increase in EU softness will in fact improve the chances that candidates enter
with an HBC. Yet, this case might be considered rather unusual, in the sense
that it says that the applicant government is very eager to obtain HBCs while
the EU is not.
The eﬀects of closing the door
Next the eﬀect of altering the probability that the game may end Á stems also
both from reactions in ¯ tg and ¯ tf. Again for simplicity we assume equal rates
of time preferences ½g = ½f = ½ and calculate @h
@Á (see separate Appendix)
and obtain the following result (for proofs, see separate Appendix):
Proposition 3. There exists a critical pc < 1 such that for all cases




¯¡¿, i.e. the government’s win/lose ratio is greater than the
ﬁrms’ win/lose ratio, then @h
@Á < 0, i.e. an increase in the probability





¯¡¿, i.e. the government’s win/lose ratio is less than the
ﬁrms’ win/lose ratio, then @h
@Á > 0, i.e. an increase in the probability of
no further enlargement rounds improves the government’s chances of
winning.
In plain words, proposition 3 says that the player that has more at stake
(i.e. the larger win/lose ratio) is hurt more severely by a higher risk of closing
the door, i.e. is more likely to lose the game. One immediate policy conclu-
sion that can be derived from this ﬁnding is that an EU that suﬀers from a
relatively soft image can only improve the chances of applicants displaying
budget discipline by limiting the number of enlargement rounds if the govern-
ment of the applicant country has less at stake than the ﬁrms. Otherwise,
keeping the enlargement process open (reducing Á) is the superior option.
applicant will be allowed to enter as soon as judged to be ready on grounds of its merits.
However, in reality – given the ﬁxed costs (e.g. reorganising the EU institutions) that
each enlargement round causes – it appears that Á is larger than zero. Further, as will be
shown below, an increase in Á need not strengthen the government’s position.
17However, proposition 3 applies only for high levels of p. In order to be able
to derive results for low levels of p one has to simplify the analysis further
by assuming ½g = ½f = 0. One can now state:
Proposition 4. There exists a critical pk > 0 such that when p < pk:
i) for Á ! 1 a further increase in Á reduces the government’s chances of
winning, i.e. @h
@Á < 0.
ii) for Á ! 0
(a) @h
@Á > 0 if ®+¾
¾ >
¯¡¿
¿ , i.e. the government’s chances of winning
are improved when the risk of closing the door rises.
(b) @h
@Á < 0 if ®+¾
¾ <
¯¡¿
¿ , i.e. the government’s chances of winning
are reduced when the risk of closing the door rises.
For proof see separate Appendix. Thus in terms of policy, proposition 4
says that, assuming the EU is interested in aiding the SBC hardening process
in the applicant countries and assuming that the EU is perceived as tough (p
low), then a policy of closing the door can only be beneﬁcial if we are in case
(ii) (a), i.e a situation where ®+¾
¾ >
¯¡¿
¿ , which says that the government’s
ratio of winning over the gain from winning must be larger than the ﬁrms’
ratio of losing over the cost of losing. Only in such a situation does closing the
door promote the regime switch towards HBCs. In all other cases, keeping
the enlargement process open (reducing Á) will help the applicants to harden
SBCs.
To sum up, our model predicts that a conditionality for membership in
the EU can increase the probability that a country will implement an HBC.
The model does not, however, state that accession candidates will necessarily
enforce HBCs in all cases. The outcome of the war of attrition depends on
whether enterprises or the government have more at stake in the enlargement
process. Moreover, a tough application of the accession criteria by the EU
and limiting the number of future enlargement rounds will only under certain
parameter constellations aid the budget constraint hardening process.
4 Empirical evidence
Our theoretical examination of the eﬀects of outside conditionality on SBCs
arrives at various results and scenarios which cannot possibly all be tested
empirically. Instead we focus on the underlying hypothesis that the outside
conditionality imposed by the status of being an accession candidate to the
18EU has resulted in a hardening of SBCs. As introduced in Section 2, the
SBC syndrome can manifest itself in several ways: injection of reﬁnancing
or credit from ﬁnancial institutions or the state, direct budgetory subsidies,
a reduction of taxes, a renegotiation of administrative prices, tax-, wage-,
and interenterprise arrears, etc. The crucial point of the SBC syndrome is
that these transfers are paid ex post, i.e. after the ﬁrm’s losses have been
observed, in order to bail out loss-making enterprises (Kornai, 1980; Goldfeld
and Quandt, 1988, 1990; Schaﬀer, 1989; Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995).
Since the soft budget syndrome is characterised by ex post payments of
transfers rather than by the existence of governmental subsidies and other
transfer payments per se, it is not a straightforward matter to measure SBCs.
Budgetary subsidies deriving from price controls can hardly be separated
from ﬁnancial support to ineﬃcient and otherwise loss-making enterprises,
such that the volume of subsidies is not appropriate to measure the SBC
syndrome. A possible indicator used in the literature are tax arrears, al-
though ﬁrms may lobby for tax arrears even if they are not in ﬁnancial dis-
tress (Schaﬀer, 1998). Moreover, diﬀerences in reporting and measurement
makes cross-country comparisions of tax arrears diﬃcult. Another measure
for SBCs which is applied in the empirical literature is the volume of credits
classiﬁed as bad by the banking system. The banking system is indeed one
of the key channels by which loss-making ﬁrms are subsidised in transition
countries. Unfortunately, bad loans are neither necessary nor suﬃcient evi-
dence of SBCs (Schaﬀer, 1998): on the one hand, ﬁnancial institutions may
hide soft loans in their balance sheets and roll over debts when they are due,
while on the other hand banks may increasingly report non-performing loans
inherited from the past in their balance sheets without providing fresh money
to loss-making ﬁrms. Furthermore, interenterprise arrears are also a prob-
lematic measure of SBCs, since they do not necessarily imply the softening of
ﬁnancial discipline of the enterprise sector. Moreover, the empirical evidence
shows that the levels of interenterprise arrears in many transition countries
have been stable over time and in fact comparable to the levels observed
in western market economies (Belka et al. 1995; Bonin and Schaﬀer, 1995;
Alfandari and Schaﬀer, 1996; Schaﬀer, 1998).
Another strand of the empirical literature refers to business account data
of ﬁrms in transition countries. Again, several conceptional problems plague
the empirical analysis. According to the deﬁnition of the SBC, we are looking
for evidence that fresh money is provided to ﬁrms even if losses are persistent.
This involves several problems of measurement: ﬁrst, even if an enterprise
has made losses in the past, there may be the expectation of large proﬁts in
the future, which makes it rational to provide additional ﬁnancial resources
for a lender which attempts to enforce hard budget constraints. Second, ﬁrms
19may be economically viable but persistently loss-making if they have a large
debt burden, i.e. if the debt service exceeds operating proﬁts. The existence
of these ﬁrms is again no evidence of SBCs, since debts may increase in this
case without an injection of fresh money into the enterprise. Moreover, there
are several problems of measuring proﬁts by historical cost accounting in an
environment with inﬂation (for a detailed discussion see Schaﬀer, 1998).
Not surprisingly, given these conceptual problems, the empirical literature
on the SBC syndrome in transition countries yields inconclusive and even
contradictory results. As an example, the EBRD transition report ranks
Belarus below all accession candidates with respect to enterprise reform and
enforcement of ﬁnancial discipline in the enterprise sector (EBRD, 2001, p.
14), while Carlin et al. (2001) ﬁnd on the basis of a comprehensive survey
of 3,300 ﬁrms in 25 transition countries that the enforcement of HBCs is
comparable in Belarus to the enforcement observed in the Czech Republic
and Slovenia. Moreover, many indicators of SBCs are only available for few
time-series observations, rendering an analysis of the impact of candidate
status impossible.
Against this background, we take a diﬀerent route in measuring SBCs
here. Instead of measuring them directly, we focus on the consequences of
SBCs for the behaviour of enterprises. Speciﬁcally, we examine whether or
not candidate countries display (i) a long term lower labour to output ratio
and (ii) a faster adjustment of labour demand to output shocks. The advan-
tage of this approach is that macroeconomic data on output and employment
which allow cross-country and cross-time comparisions are easily available.
The underlying hypothesis that soft budget constraints result in excess labour
demand and less adjustment of employment to economic shocks is well es-
tablished in the SBC literature. Starting with Kornai (1979, 1980), labour
hoarding has been recognised as one of the key features of the SBC syndrome.
Enterprises that expect a bail-out tend to hire more labour than enterprises
that operate in an environment with HBCs. Consequently, one expects that
economies where SBCs persist tend to produce more labour intensively, and
tend to adjust their labour force less swiftly to demand shocks than their
counterparts with HBCs. More formally, Hillman et al. (1987) show that
the factor demand of ﬁrms increases if output prices are uncertain and ﬁrms
expect ex ante a bailout in case of unfavourable output prices.19 Similarly,
19Hillman et al. (1987) also show that if the ﬁrm’s capital decision – and not just
the labour decision – can be revised in response to the bail out probability, if ﬁrms can
actually be liquidated, and if the probability of bail-out reacts only weakly to the amount
of labour employed by the ﬁrm, then there exist parameter constellations where a high
probability of government bail-out has an ambiguous eﬀect on the relative labour intensity
in production.
20Goldfeld and Quandt (1988, 1990) demonstrate in a series of models that soft
transfers trigger a rising factor demand of ﬁrms, in particular a rising labour
demand. Moreover, there exist a number of models which underline that the
main motive for granting soft transfers by a paternalistic government is to
induce ﬁrms to maintain higher levels of employment, which results again in
excess labour demand (e.g. Boycko et al., 1996).20 Case studies at the enter-
prise level in transition countries in the 1990s indeed provide ample evidence
that the hardening of budget constraints is associated with the shedding of
excess labour and increasing labour productivity.21
However, it is worth noting that a caveat applies to our approach: other
factors than the hardening of budget constraints may aﬀect labour produc-
tivity and the adjustment of employment to output shocks: international
specialisation patterns may trap countries in a state of low labour produc-
tivity, and rigid labour market institutions may hinder the adjustment of
employment to output shocks even if hard budget constraints are enforced
in the economy. Nevertheless, we believe that in case of the transition coun-
tries, where excess labour demand was widespread in the beginning of the
transition process, rising labour productivity and the adjustment of employ-
ment to economic shocks are the best macroeconomic indicators available for
cross-country and cross-time comparisons of the hardening of budget con-
straints.
The remainder of this Section is organised as follows: First, we motivate
our empirical examination of the SBC syndrome by a simple model of labour
demand – similar to Hillman et al. (1987) – where ﬁrms face soft budget
constraints. From this we derive our speciﬁcation of the estimation equation.
Second, we describe the data base. Third, we present the estimation results.
4.1 Model speciﬁcation
Consider ﬁrst the standard case of the labour demand of a risk-neutral ﬁrm
operating in an environment with price (demand) uncertainty and under
HBCs. The conditions in the product market are characterised either by a
favorable state with a high price level P, which is expected with probability
p in each period, and an unfavorable state with a low price P, which occurs
20In fact even within the Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) model one can argue that the
‘slow and bad’ projects – which require reﬁnancing – do not just absorb more capital for a
given amount of ﬁnal output, but also consume more of all other inputs, including labour.
21See for Poland Pinto et al. 1993; for Russia de Boisseau et al. 1995, and Pinto et al.
2000; for Romania Abdelati and Claessens, 1996, and Coricelli and Djankov, 1998; and
for Bulgaria Djankov and Hoekman, 2000, and Claessens and Peters, 1997. Furthermore,
see the comprehensive surveys of Carlin et al., 2001 and Frydman et al., 2000.
21with probability 1 ¡ p. Thus the expected price is
P
e = p P + (1 ¡ p)P: (7)
For such a ﬁrm, the expected proﬁts are ¼e = P eY ¡ wL ¡ rK where Y
is output and L and K denote labour and capital respectively; and w and r
denote the wage and interest rate. Assuming that the ﬁrm is a price-taker
and has to ﬁx its labour input and production at the beginning of each period
– i.e. before the actual price on its product market is revealed – then the
proﬁt maximising labour demand, given a short-run ﬁxed capital stock and













e Y = ¸h Y; (8)
Thus, ¸h denotes the optimal labour-to-output ratio in the case of HBCs.
Consider now the same ﬁrm operating under an SBC. The ﬁrm still max-
imises proﬁts, but it can expect to receive a subsidy S in the unfavorable
state 1 ¡ p. The literature contains many variants of the SBC phenomenon,
but in one way or the other, the size of these subsidies is positively corre-
lated to the size of the ﬁrms, i.e. to the output and employment of the ﬁrm
(e.g. Carlin et al., 2001; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Hillman et al., 1987).
Formally, we assume that the SBC transfer S(Y;L) is a function of output
and labour, where S(0;0) = 0 and @S
@Y ; @S
@L; @Y




eY + (1 ¡ p)S(Y;L) ¡ wL ¡ rK





w ¡ (1 ¡ p)dS
dL
P
e Y = ¸s Y : (9)
Thus ¸s denotes the optimal labour-to-output ratio in the case of an SBC.
Note that a well-deﬁned solution of equation (9) requires that w > (1¡p)dS
dL.
Since the partial derivatives of S(Y;L) are positive, and since @Y
@L is positive,
we have dS=dL > 0 and can state:
¸s > ¸h : (10)
Thus, the optimal ratio of the labour force to output in an SBC enterprise
is larger than that of its HBC counterpart. This illustrates the intuitively
compelling result that an excessive level of employment can be taken as an
indicator of SBCs.
22To determine the equilibrium labour demand, we have so far assumed that
the development of prices follows a stationary process, where the probability
of a high price and the counter-probability of a low price are the same in each
period. This is hardly a realistic description of real-world processes, where
price levels vary widely such that P e
t 6= P e
t¡1. As a consequence, ﬁrms have
to adjust output and their labour force to changes in expected price levels.
Since hiring and ﬁring involves costs, the ﬁrm will not immediately adjust its
labour force to the level desired in the long-run equilibrium. A simple way
to specify the dynamics of such a system with adjustment costs is a partial
adjustment model,
Lt ¡ Lt¡1 = ° (L
¤
t ¡ Lt¡1); 0 < ° < 1;
where the actual change in the labour force is only a fraction of the desired
change, and the speed of adjustment is determined by the parameter °.
Thus the parameter ° measures the costs of adjustment relative to the costs
of being in disequilibrium. Since SBCs – as shown above – reduce ceteris
paribus the costs of being in disequilibrium, we must have:
°h > °s (11)
whereby h and s denote the situation under hard and soft budgets respec-
tively. Substituting (8) and (9) respectively for L¤ and bringing the lagged
dependent on the right hand side yields
Lt = °j ¸j Yt + (1 ¡ °j)Lt¡1; j 2 fh; sg; (12)
which forms the basis for the speciﬁcation of our estimation model.
4.2 The data
For the empirical analysis we pool aggregate employment and output data
from 21 transition countries in the period 1990-99. Our sample comprises
the ten accession candidates to the EU22 and 11 non-candidate countries23.
Presumably, all these countries were characterised by a regime of SBCs as
a legacy from central planning at the beginning of the transition process.
Subsequently to the formulation of the pre-accession strategy of 1994, can-
didate status was oﬃcially granted to the accession candidates. This allows
us to use the variance of economic behavior in the accession countries both
22See footnote 2.
23Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Croatia, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Kazhakstan, FYR
Macedonia, Russian Federation, Ukraine, Uzbekistan.
23before and after candidate status was granted – i.e. pinpointing the time
period when outside conditionality should kick in –, as well as the variance
of economic behavior across candidate and non-candidate countries for the
empirical analysis. However, our data base is, with ten time-series observa-
tions, rather small, and adjustment to the new institutional and economic
environment is not yet completed in the transition economies.
We use real GDP and total employment data from the UN/ECE Common
Database (UN/ECE, 2002, Appendix Tables B.1 and B.5), which are derived
from national statistics and statistics of the CIS, as output and employment
variables. Both variables are used in index form, in order to control for
initial diﬀerences in labour productivity across countries. Both indexes are
denominated to the year 1989.
4.3 Estimation results
On basis of the partial adjustment model in (12) we estimate the equation
Lit = ® + ¯1Yit + ¯2D
¤





itTrendt + ¯7Dit + uit; (13)
where Lit is the aggregate employment index, ® a constant, Yit aggregate
output index, Dit a dummy variable which has a value of 1 if country i has a
candidate status at time t, and zero otherwise, Trendt a time trend, and uit
the disturbance term. The subscript i denotes the ith country (i = 1;:::;21),
and the subscript t the tth year (t = 1;::::;10).
Thus, we complemented the model in (12) by a time trend, which should
capture other factors which persistently change the labour-to-output ratio
such as labour augmenting technological progress. For the countries which
do not possess a candidate status in period t, we can identify the structural
parameters of the model °non and ¸non from the estimated coeﬃcients as
1 ¡ ¯3 and ¯1=(1 ¡ ¯3), respectively. We follow the usual convention in
assuming that the disturbance term is speciﬁed as a two-way error-component
model (Hsiao, 1996), i.e. that uit = ¹i + Àt + ºit where ¹i denotes the
country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect, Àt a year-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect, and ºit is white
noise. This can be justiﬁed by country speciﬁc characteristics and common
macroeconomic shocks. We started by estimating the model with the full set
of time and country dummies and then tested for their signiﬁcance jointly as
well separately.
For the countries that possess candidate status, the parameters °can and
¸can are calculated as (1 ¡ ¯3 ¡ ¯4) and (¯1 + ¯2)=(1 ¡ ¯3 ¡ ¯4), respec-
tively. Thus, if ¯4 < 0, the adjustment parameter °can > °non, and, hence,
24the speed of adjustment is higher in the candidate countries. The interpreta-
tion of the coeﬃcient ¯2 is less straightforward: if ¯2 < 0, and if ¯4 < 0, too,
then ¸can < ¸non, and, hence, the long-run ratio of employment with respect
to output is smaller in the candidate countries than in the non-candidate
countries. However, if ¯4 < 0, even a zero or positive value of the coeﬃcient
¯2 can yield a ¸can < ¸non. We therefore present the implicit values of the
structural parameters together with the estimation results.
Table 2: Pooled Estimation Results1;2of Partial Employment Adjustment Model
Yit Dit*Yit Li;t¡1 Dit*Li;t¡1 Trend Dit*Trend Dit Const. R2
A. Total Sample (21 countries), 1990-993;4
0.116 -0.060 0.839 -0.158 0.313 -0.953 25.346 6.900 0.97
(4.86) -(2.11) (26.11) -(2.52) (2.42) -(3.69) (4.15) (1.51)
B. Candidate countries (10 countries), 1990-993;5
0.206 -0.122 0.804 -0.131 0.529 -1.235 29.201 -0.071 0.89
(7.76) -(4.01) (10.06) -(1.77) (1.43) -(3.12) (3.42) -(.01)
1 Numbers in parenthesis denote t-statistics.
2 All regressions include country dummies.
3 LSDV regression with Prais-Winsten heteroscedasticity corrected standard errors.
4 Implicit parameter values: °non = 0:161, °can = 0:369, ¸non = 0:720, ¸can = 0:176.
5 Implicit parameter values: °non = 0:196, °can = 0:327, ¸non = 1:020, ¸can = 0:250.
Results for the total sample
We begin to estimate equation (13) for the total sample. Although coun-
try and time dummies were highly signiﬁcant jointly, it turns out that the
time dummies are not signiﬁcant when tested separately.24 Consequently,
we present here our estimates with the signiﬁcant country-speciﬁc eﬀects
only. As shown in Section A of Table 2, both the coeﬃcients of the interac-
tion dummies of the candidate status with the lagged employment variable
24Both country and time dummies are jointly signiﬁcant with an observed F-statistic of
4.21, which has a p-value of well below one percent under the null distribution of F(29,172).
The observed F-statistic for the signiﬁcance of the time dummies (given the existence of
the country-speciﬁc eﬀects) is 1.36, which has a p-value of above 5 per cent under the null
distribution of F(9,172), and the observed F-statistic for the signiﬁcance of the country
dummies is 5.30, which has a p-value of well above 1 per cent under the null distribution
of F(20,172). These results emphasize the importance of country-speciﬁc eﬀects in the
partial employment adjustment equation.
25and the output variable have a negative sign and are statistically signiﬁcant,
which implies that:
(i) the estimated adjustment parameter °can is signiﬁcantly larger than
°non, i.e. countries which have a candidate status at time t adjust their
labour force to equilibrium levels more quickly,
(ii) the estimated parameter ¸can, which determines the ratio of employ-
ment to output in the long-run, is signiﬁcantly below ¸non, i.e. coun-
tries which possess a candidate status at time t tend to have a lower
employment-to-output ratio.
Thus, these estimates conﬁrm the hypothesis that accession candidates
have lower labour-to-output ratios and a higher speed of adjusting employ-
ment to output shocks than non-candidate countries. However, it is worth
noting that the values of the long-run coeﬃcient ¸can seem to be implausibly
low. This is perhaps a hint that the results suﬀer from some estimation bias,
a problem which is discussed below.
Does candidate status aﬀect the SBC problem?
One possible objection to estimating equation (13) is that the development
of the output and employment variables may have aﬀected the decision to
grant the candidate status. In order to address the problem of a possible
endogeneity, we conducted two alternative experiments: ﬁrst, we estimated
equation (13) for accession candidate countries only, in order to examine
whether we can observe a change in economic behaviour within the same
group of countries before and after candidate status was granted, i.e. before
and after EU conditionality was set. Second, we split the sample into two
time periods, 1990-94 and 1995-1999, in order to examine whether we ob-
serve a diﬀerence in economic behavior between the countries that become
candidates later and the non-candidate countries in the periods before and
after candidate status was granted.
As can be seen in Section B of Table 2, the results of the candidate country
sample are close to those of the total sample: we observe again that both
the coeﬃcients of the interaction dummies of the candidate status with the
lagged employment variable and the output variable have a negative sign and
are still statistically signiﬁcant.25 Thus, the regression based on the (later)
candidate country sample shows again that:
25The coeﬃcient for the interaction dummy with the lagged employment variable is
statistically signiﬁcant only at the 10 per cent level.
26(i) granting the candidate status is associated with a higher speed of ad-
justment
(ii) granting the candidate status is associated with a lower labour-to-
output ratio relative to the period before the countries become accession
candidates.
Country group diﬀerences pre and post enlargement option
To further investigate the mechanics of the outside conditionality, consider
the following. If the EU had only started membership negotiations with
those countries that already had an HBC regime, than this altered perfor-
mance must already be observable prior to the oﬃcial start of membership
negotiations and imposition of EU conditionality. Hence we compare the
situation in candidate and non-candidate countries in the ﬁrst and second
half of the 1990s.
Table 3: Pooled Estimation Results1;2 of Partial Employment Adjustment
Equation, 1990-94 and 1995-99
Yit Di*Yit Li;t¡1 Di*Li;t¡1 Trendt Di * Trendt Const. R2
A. Total Sample (21 countries), 1990-943;4
0.222 0.004 0.775 -0.086 0.962 -0.792 1.980 0.95
2.13) (.04) (6.9) -(.55) (1.08) -(.77) (.12)
B. Total Sample (21 countries), 1995-993;5
0.202 -0.126 0.624 -0.029 -0.226 -0.423 28.199 0.99
(4.1) -(1.87) (11.08) -(.2) -(1.46) -(1.78) (4.23)
1 Numbers in parenthesis denote t-statistics.
2 All regressions include country dummies.
3 LSDV regression with Prais-Winsten heteroscedasticity corrected standard errors.
4 Implicit parameter values: °non = 0:225, °can = 0:310, ¸non = 0:984, ¸can = 0:727.
5 Implicit parameter values: °non = 0:376, °can = 0:405, ¸non = 0:536, ¸can = 0:188.
Table 3 reports the results from the estimation of a variant of equa-
tion (13):
Lit = ® + ¯1Yit + ¯2D
¤





iTrendt + ¯7Di + uit; (14)
where the dummy variable Di has the value of 1, if the country belongs to
the group of (later) accession candidates, and 0 otherwise. The disturbance
27term is speciﬁed as uit = ¹i + ºit, since again the country-speciﬁc eﬀects have
turned out to be highly signiﬁcant.26 Interestingly enough, the estimate
in Section A of Table 3 shows that both candidate dummies turned out
to be statistically insigniﬁcant in the pre-candidate period. Moreover, the
regression results reported in Section B of Table 3 show that the interaction
dummy with the output variable becomes statistically signiﬁcant (at the 10
percent-level) after the candidate status has been granted. Thus we can
– with the appropriate caution, given our sample size of ﬁve time series
observations – state:
(i) there is no observable signiﬁcant diﬀerence of employment adjustment
between the later candidate and the non-candidate countries in the
early 1990s.
(ii) the labour-to-output ratio in the candidate countries falls relative to
the non-candidate countries after the candidate status has been granted
(post-1995).
Thus the candidates for accession to the EU changed their economic be-
havior with respect to labour hoarding and the adjustment of employment
to output shocks after candidate status was granted. However, the dynamic
ﬁxed eﬀect estimator that we have applied is subject to a simultaneous equa-
tion bias due to the presence of the lagged dependent variable (Nickell, 1981;
Kiviet, 1995). Although the ﬁxed eﬀect estimator avoids the inconsistency
which arises if the country-speciﬁc eﬀects are correlated with the other ex-
planatory variables, serial correlation of the disturbance terms in equations
(13) and (14) introduces endogeneity between the ºit and the lagged employ-
ment variable. The estimation bias declines with the time dimension of the
panel, but it may be substantial in the case of our small sample (Judson
and Owen, 1999). In Appendix 1 we therefore present a consistent GMM
estimator, which largely conﬁrms the results of our ﬁxed eﬀects estimations.
5 Conclusions and policy implications
This paper has theoretically and empirically examined the question of
whether or not the conditionalities that the EU has imposed on applicant
countries in the process of eastern enlargement – e.g. the Copenhagen cri-
teria and the monitoring of the progress towards compliance with the acquis
26The observed F-statistic in regression A and B for the signiﬁcance of the country
dummies is 2.70 and 4.17, respectively, which yields in both cases a p-value of well above
1 per cent under the null distribution of F(20,78).
28communautaire – can help the candidate countries to tackle the persisting
domestic SBC problem. We understand the SBC syndrome as a state of
regime with institutions that result in an inability of the government (or in
fact banks) to credibly commit to enforcing ﬁnancial discipline on the enter-
prise sector ex post. In case of countries which are trapped in such an SBC
status quo, the shift towards institutions which could enable the government
to enforce hard budget constraints may, however, be blocked by those who
beneﬁt from SBCs, e.g. the ﬁrms and their employees. Many observers of
the enlargement process have argued that the prospect of EU membership –
which beneﬁts both governments and ﬁrms – could challenge this stalemate
in the balance of power in the applicant countries.
This fundamental reasoning is captured in our model, where the outside
conditionality of the EU demands a regime shift towards HBCs. While ﬁrms
hold the key to implementing HBCs by agreeing to the regime switch and
complying with ﬁnancial discipline, the government holds the key to negoti-
ating EU membership. Hence both parties can hold each other hostage, i.e.
ﬁrms and government play a waiting game in complying with HBCs and in
negotiating the country into the EU. Furthermore, even though the EU has
conditioned membership on the enforcement of HBCs, the actual toughness
of the conditionality is uncertain. We use this war of attrition setting to
study the impact of several policy parameters. Our central ﬁnding is that
external conditionality can play an important role in resolving the domestic
SBC issue, but need not necessarily do so. From our results a number of
policy implications emerge:
First, a necessary condition for resolving the SBC syndrome via outside
conditionality is that ﬁrms beneﬁt more from EU membership than they lose
from an enforcement of HBCs. Although it may seen fairly obvious, this
result has important policy implications: the EU can increase the pressure
on changing the domestic balance of power by raising the beneﬁts from eco-
nomic integration to the ﬁrms through e.g. full market access or complete
dismantling of technical barriers for future members. 27
Second, the perceived toughness of the EU conditions can – if believed to
be strict enough – immediately resolve the domestic SBC problem. This is
exactly the strategy that the Copenhagen Criteria and the Commission’s an-
nual progress reports pursued, namely, threatening the ultimate punishment
of keeping out non-performing candidates.
Third, we also show that outside conditionality may be less powerful if
27This may explain why an outside conditionality imposed by the EU can turn out to
be more successful than that of ﬁnancial institutions like the IMF, where no more than
governmental credits are at stake.
29the applicant’s government is too eager to get the country into the EU, while
ﬁrms have less at stake or are more patient. Again, the EU can increase the
power of the outside conditionality by raising the beneﬁts from integration
for those who have to agree on the regime shift relative to those who want
the integration anyway.
Fourth, a policy of direct compensation from the EU to the applicant
countries’ ﬁrms or sectors for the costs that stem from structural adjustment
will strengthen the applicant governments’ positions and thus the eﬀective-
ness of the imposed conditionality. In fact, this is exactly what the ﬁnancial
assistance programmes, designed in the pre-accession strategy and agreed
upon in the 1994 European Council, were aiming at.
Fifth, our model shows that the opportunity of closing the door, i.e. lim-
iting the number of future enlargement rounds, can aid the budget hardening
process if the EU conditionality is perceived as relatively soft and if the ﬁrms
have more at stake in the future membership than the government. In all
other cases, keeping the enlargement process open will improve the eﬀective-
ness of outside conditionality.
Finally, some counter-intuitive results emerge as well: for example, we
ﬁnd that within our model for certain parameter constellations, a softening
of EU conditionality (i.e. laxer enforcement) need not warrant victory of
the ﬁrms in the war of attrition. On the contrary, faced with a softer EU,
the government may become more hesitant to promote the application, i.e.
the government fears that the country will actually be admitted despite the
persisting SBC problem. Accordingly the governments willingness to wait –
and hence its chance to win the war of attrition – increases.
In the empirical part of the paper, we examine our underlying hypothesis
on the impact of outside conditionality for 21 transition countries over a ten-
year period. We base our estimations on the relationship between output and
employment. We show in a micro framework that the labour-to-output ratio,
and more importantly, the adjustment speed of labour demand to output
shocks can be taken as indicators of the softness of budget constraints. We
ﬁnd that those transition countries that hold a membership option – i.e. are
subject to the EU conditionality – have a lower long-run ratio of labour to
output and display a swifter adjustment of labour demand to output shocks.
Thus, in line with our theoretical model, our empirical results indicate that
the imposed conditionality on future members of the EU does indeed yield a
hardening of budget constraints.
To sum up: a beneﬁcial impact of outside conditionality on SBC
hardening in transition economies, which observers have associated with
the soon-to-be-completed enlargement process of the EU, does exist. This
paper has outlined the mechanics of such conditionality theoretically and
30veriﬁed its impact empirically. However, our approach can only serve as
a ﬁrst step towards understanding the role of external conditionalities
on internal economic problems. Future research will have to continue to
examine the phenomenon of the SBC and the impact and functioning of
outside conditionalities. In particular, since ever more supranational organi-
sations place conditions on national economic conduct, and since the soft
budget constraint, despite its genesis in the context of socialist and transi-
tion economies, is by no means a phenomenon unknown to market economies.
31Appendix 1
GMM estimations of the partial labour adjustment equation
There are several methods of controlling for group-speciﬁc eﬀects; see Ander-
son and Hsiao (1981), Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995),
Ahn and Schmidt (1995) and Kiviet (1995). Here, we apply the one- and
two-step GMM estimators proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), which
tend to perform better than the Anderson-Hsiao estimator with our sample
size (Judson and Owen, 1991). The Arellano-Bond estimators assume that
the error term is not serially correlated (tested below). Moreover, Arellano
and Bond (1991) provide a Sargan-test for over-identifying restrictions.
Since models which incorporate interaction dummies with the lagged de-
pendent variable cannot be used, we estimated for both country groups the
pre- and post-candidate periods separately. The regression diagnostics in Ta-
ble A1 show that the null hypothesis of valid over-identifying restrictions is
not rejected by the Sargan-test in most regressions. Note that Arellano and
Bond (1991) found evidence that the Sargan-test may over-reject the null of
valid over-identifying restrictions in the presence of heteroscedasticity. For
inference on model speciﬁcation, the Sargan-test based on the two-step esti-
mator is more appropriate in this case. Indeed, while the Sargan-test in the
one-step regressions rejects the null of valid over-identifying rejections, it is
not rejected in the two-step regression in Section B (Table A1). However, au-
tocorrelation of the residuals is present in some cases. Note that the presence
of ﬁrst-order autocorrelation does not, in contrast to second-order autocor-
relation, imply that the estimates are inconsistent. The two-step estimator
increases the eﬃciency of estimation substantially, but may bias coeﬃcients
and the standard errors downwards. Although in our case coeﬃcients and
t-statistics between the one-step and the two-step regressions are rather sim-
ilar, we recommend the one-step estimates for inference (Arellano and Bond,
1991).
Table A1 shows that the GMM estimators yield much lower coeﬃcients
in all samples for the lagged dependent variable, and, hence, higher values
for the adjustment parameter °. This is as expected in the literature (Kiviet,
1995, Judson and Owen, 1999). However, although the size of the structural
parameters has changed relative to the LSDV-estimates, the GMM estimates
support the general results of the paper: (i) a comparison of the periods be-
fore and after candidate status was awarded shows that the speed of adjust-
ment has increased at least moderately, while the long-run labour-to-output
ratio has fallen substantially (Sections A and B of Table A1); (ii) in the pe-
riod after the candidate status was granted the speed of adjustment in the
32candidate countries is substantially above that of non-candidates, while the
long-run ratio of labour to output is substantially below (Sections B and D
of Table A1); (iii) in the period before candidate status was granted there is
no clear pattern: the adjustment parameter in the later candidate countries
is estimated to be higher than that of the non-candidates, but the long-run
ratio of labour to output is also estimated to be higher in the later candidate
countries compared to the non-candidates (Sections A and C of Table A1).
Table A1: Results of LSDV and GMM-Estimations of Labour Adjustment1
Yit Li;t¡1 Tt Const. R2 Wald-test2 ° ¸
A. Candidate Countries, 1990-95
LSDV3 0.213 0.672 0.013 9.374 0.75 - 0.33 0.65
(6.31) (7.63) -(.03) (.93)
Arellano-Bond4 0.280 0.549 -0.236 - - 458.70 0.45 0.62
(one-step) (7.01) (3.4) -(.37)
Arellano-Bond5 0.261 0.576 -0.267 - - 25466.13 0.42 0.61
(two-step) (17.14) (14.59) -(1.74)
B. Candidate countries, 1996-99
LSDV6 0.076 0.595 -0.650 31.271 0.60 - 0.41 0.19
(1.4) (3.73) -(2.64) (2.26)
Arellano-Bond7 0.094 0.522 -0.746 - - 105.45 0.48 0.20
(one-step) (2.35) (3.93) -(4.09)
Arellano-Bond8 0.129 0.486 -0.791 - - 583.57 0.51 0.25
(two-step) (2.71) (5.75) -(9.42)
1 Partial Labour Adjustment Equation. Numbers in parentheses denote t-statistics; the LSDV regressions
include country dummies.
2 Â2(3)-statistic for the Wald-test of the joint signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients.
3 The F(9,47)-statistic for the joint signiﬁcance of the country dummies: 3.93 (Pr>F=0.0009).
4 The Â2-statistic for the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions is 8.5 (Pr > Â2(14) = 0.86); the
t-statistics for the Arellano-Bond test of ﬁrst- and second-order autocorrelation of the residuals is -1.46
and -0.22, respectively.
5 The Â2-statistic for the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions is 5.8(Pr > Â2(14) = 0.97); the t-
statistics for the Arellano-Bond test of ﬁrst- and second-order autocorrelation of the residuals is -1.26 and
-0.5, respectively.
6 The F(9,37)-statistic for the joint signiﬁcance of the country dummies: 2.29 (Pr >F = 0.037).
7 The Â2-statistic for the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions is 61.89 (Pr > Â2(29) = 0.0004); the
t-statistics for the Arellano-Bond test of ﬁrst- and second-order autocorrelation of the residuals is -0.29
and 1.97, respectively.
8 The Â2-statistic for the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions is 8.61 (Pr > Â2(29) = 0.9999); the
t-statistics for the Arellano-Bond test of ﬁrst- and second-order autocorrelation of the residuals is -0.02
and -1.91, respectively.
33Table A1 (cont.):
Yit Li;t¡1 Tt Const. R2 Wald-test2 ° ¸
C. Non-candidate countries, 1990-95
LSDV9 0.130 0.803 0.401 5.746 0.75 - 0.20 0.66
(2.05) (9.53) (.69) (.44)
Arellano-Bond10 0.126 0.713 0.201 - - 102.64 0.29 0.44
(one-step) (1.62) (5.87) (.3)
Arellano-Bond11 0.120 0.700 0.260 - - 1822.07 0.30 0.40
(two-step) (16.29) (20.02) (2.44)
D. Non-candidate countries, 1996-99
LSDV12 0.202 0.624 -0.226 22.707 0.73 - 0.38 0.54
(3.5) (9.03) -(1.31) (3.39)
Arellano-Bond13 0.135 0.670 -0.082 - - 77.0 0.33 0.41
(one-step) (2.06) (7.99) -(.45)
Arellano-Bond14 0.124 0.703 -0.067 - - 804.58 0.30 0.42
(two-step) (2.02) (24.71) -(.73)
9 The F(9,47)-statistic for the joint signiﬁcance of the country dummies: 3.06 (Pr > F = 0.004).
10 The Â2-statistic for the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions is 14.15 (Pr > Â2(14) = 0.44); the
t-statistics for the Arellano-Bond test of ﬁrst- and second-order autocorrelation of the residuals is -2.25
and -1.47, respectively.
11 The Â2-statistic for the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions is 8.13 (Pr > Â2(14) = 0.88); the
t-statistics for the Arellano-Bond test of ﬁrst- and second-order autocorrelation of the residuals is -1.41
and -0.92, respectively.
12 The F(10,41)-statistic for the joint signiﬁcance of the country dummies: 7.02 (Pr>F=0.0000).
13 The Â2-statistic for the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions is 28.6 (Pr > Â2(29) = 0.49); the
t-statistics for the Arellano-Bond test of ﬁrst- and second-order autocorrelation of the residuals is -2.46
and 0.34, respectively.
14 The Â2-statistic for the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions is 9.08 (Pr > Â2(29) = 0.99); the
t-statistics for the Arellano-Bond test of ﬁrst- and second-order autocorrelation of the residuals is -1.76
and 0.56, respectively.
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